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I.
INTRODUCTION.
Keynes' closing remarks in The General Theory are II . . .
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
. . . . I am sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. . . . Soon or late it is ideas, not vested for good or evil.ttl interests, which are dangerous
The ideas that Keynes refers to are theories. A theory of system behavior is a prior for rational action. A Therefor the present Congress needs to either repudiate its prior commitments or come up with the funds needed to validate the Congressional promise. 3
Because deposit insurance, the savings and loan industry, facets of the insurance industry and a number of great private banks quite apparently have broken down, the legislative agenda goes beyond merely funding the shortfall in the deposit insurance funds. As a minimum the Congress feels it necessary to reform the deposit insurance function and the associated regulatory and supervisory structure so that such calls for Treasury financing are not likely to recur.
As the United states struggles with the problem of fixing the financial system policy, advocates of any particular proposal needs to address three questions:
1. "What is it that is taken to be broke?", 2. "What theory about how our economy works underlies the proposal?" 3. What are the dire consequences of not fixing that which you assert is broke or alternatively how does the change you advocate make things better?
3. Congress in late 1991 provided some $70 billions to validate the liabilities of the banks.
In what follows I will take up three points 1. Two views of the results of the economic process 2. Systemic and idiosyncratic sources of financial crises 3. Some ideas about the scope for policy in the present ttcrisislt.
II. TWO VIEWS OF THE RESULTS OF MARKET PROCESSES
There are two fundamentally different views about the results that a market economy achieves. One, as stated by Adam Smith, is "As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenues of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to an end which was no part of his intention." promote The second, as stated by John Maynard Keynes, is:
"If I may be allowed to appropriate the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market and enterprise for the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life, it is by no means always the case that speculation predominates over enterprise.
As the organization of investment markets improves, the risk of the predominance of speculation does, however, increase.
. . .
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady 4 A. Smith. 1776, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, book 4, chapter 2. italics added stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activit'es of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." 3 When designing and advocating policies economists and practical men alike have to choose between the Smithian theory, that markets alwavs lead to the promotion of the public welfare, and the Keynesian theory, that market processes may lead to the capital development of the economy being ill-done, i.e. to other than the promotion of the public welfare. If the theory that takes the invisible hand conjecture as a guide to the way the economy works is valid, then intervention or regulation can only do mischief. If the theory that takes the capital development of the country may be ill done as a guide to the way the economy works is valid, then regulation and intervention can be beneficial.
Furthermore, if the consequences of doing the capital development poorly are serious, then it is politically necessary to create and apply appropriate regulations and interventions.
The Smithian view leads to the proposition that financial crises and the deep depressions which followed arose from particular institutional flaws and not because of any characteristic essential to a market economy.6 In the 5. Keynes, op tit p. 158-9 italics re casino added 6. Henry Simons, Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. JPE, 1935 . The essential proposition of the first Chicago School was that the flaw in the existing capitalist economy centered around the system of fractional reserve banking and the separation of money from the financing of current crisis the institutional flaws which have been identified as being culpable are a system of intervention which allowed some dirty rotten scoundrels to operate, external shocks which dislodged the economy, and not well grounded restrictions on banks.
In these views the current crisis reduces to being a result of managements which were allowed to exploit deposit insurance and geographic, lines of business and ownership restrictions on banks.'
The Keynesian view leads to the proposition that the essential processes of capitalist economies result in the emergence of conditions conducive to financial instability.
Potential instability is a basic from time to time system characteristic, which follows from the pivotal role of investment and financing in capitalist economies. 8 Law and policy makers need to be aware of the institutional evolution that profit seeking investors and financiers induce and which can lead to both inflationary surges and deflationary disruptions. As such instability may well lead to serious disruptions of investment and profit flows as well as income and employment, an institutional structure business would resolve the problem that leads to serious depressions.
. is to assure that the negative net worth on a mark to market basis of financial institutions in not translated into a discount on the deposit liabilities of these institutions.'
Modernizins The
The funds that Congress makes available for paying off deposits in institutions with negative net worth are not just validating deposits but are also preventing the need for these and other institutions to attempt to make position by selling out position. It would be a disaster for asset values if a broad array of intermediaries need to make position by selling out position.
9.
Deposit insurance is a commitment by the government that the specified liabilities of financial institutions will always be available at par. 13 economy results in a need to focus on how the prices on the items on the balance sheet and the cash flows that are generated and committed, all measured in a common denominator, the money of the economy, are determined.
Capital assets generate cash as compensation for their participation in the production process, financial assets generate cash as the maker is able to fulfill commitments.
In addition capital assets, as well as financial assets, can yield cash by being sold or pledged. A debt instrument or a lease provides for payments to be made on account of both interest and principal. An equity liability has only a contingent commitment to make finance, when it is not construction financing, implies a decrease in equity, for debts increase without any increase in assets.
As a result of the erosion of equity and the decrease in the ratio of cash flow in to payment commitments, Ponzi finance also leads to a deterioration in a unit's credit rating so that a unit's interest rates rise relative to the rates available to the best credits. As a result payment commitments on debt rise faster than debts. The internal relations in a Ponzi situation tend to make the conditions that led to Ponzi financing in the first place worse, not better.1'
There therefor are systemic conditions that need to be satisfied for a financial crisis to occur: the financial structure needs to be heavily indebted, involving a large element of either Ponzi finance or speculative finance which can become Ponzi. We can characterize a financial structure which is predominantly hedge financing as robust and a financial structure that is heavily speculative and Ponzi as fragile. The fundamental assertion of the financial instability hypothesis is that the financial structure evolves from being robust to being fragile over a period in which the economy does we11.20
19.
Some leveraged buy outs include "payment in kind" provisions for some of the indebtedness. Payment in kind financing is Ponzi financing.
In a number of papers Mauro Galligatti and Dominic0
Dela Gatti have shown that once the IS-LM structure is recast in terms of the price of assets and the profit cash The systemic element underlying financial crises is the evolution of the financial structure from being robust to being fragile, from being mainly characterized by hedge finance to having the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance increase. This structural change occurs because the market sets the prices of capital assets in the context of a specific institutional structure and a set of judgements as to the likelihood of alternative contingent environments.
Successful operation of the economy, defined as an interval in which no serious financial crisis and no serious depression occur, is taken to imply that the current institutional structure is less crisis and depression prone than the structure of earlier times. The view develops that those environments that are conducive to crises and debt deflations are not likely to emerge.
The way markets price capital and financial assets often reflects an heroic assumption that the unknowable can be known: that propositions about fundamentally uncertain situations can be derived by assuming that what happens i.e. the data generated by the economy, can be viewed as if it is a sample that has been drawn from a well defined probability distribution.
Investment strategies for those who control assets often are derived by treating uncertain situations as if they were amenable to the analysis used to understand flow. configurations in which the economy is stable and others in which the system is unstable can be identified. Further, under reasonable assumptions, the system migrates from financial relations which imply system stability to others which imply system instability. See As a result of the siphoning off to other economies of profits induced by deficit spending, the government deficits of the 1980's did not lead to a commensurate rise in domestic profits and improvement in domestic balance sheets.
It therefor did not trigger a sufficient rise in domestic investment, domestic profits and the consumption of domestically produced consumer goods so that income became sufficiently high so that the deficit was sharply reduced or eliminated. The uneven prosperity of the 1980's rested upon a fiscal deficit. The economy never took off, so that high income and employment levels could be sustained without the crutch supplied by massive government deficits.
In prior post war recessions the fall in private investment was first offset by increasing government deficits, which enable businesses and households to fulfill their financial commitments and clean up their balance sheets. After a short interval of dependence of profits on government deficits, investment and employment in the private economy increased, which tended to eliminate the deficit.
In the Reagan era, and to date in the Bush Presidency, the buoyancy of the American Economy has not been sufficiently great so that the need for deficits was eliminated.
In our era federal government spending is in excess of 25% of gross national product. Such big government may well make it impossible to have a depression of the length and depth of the 1929-33 experience. This is so because profits cannot fall to the same extent as in a small government environment.
In the light of the now larger size of the government it is necessary to redefine a depression: A depression in a big government capitalist economy is an extended period in which government deficits maintain profit flows, even though income and employment do fall to the extent they did in eras of small government capitalism.
The Reagan era saw a vast increase in the outstanding government debt as well as a fundamental shift in the international indebtedness position of the United States. In an early and rude stage of capitalism the main financing that took place outside of the own resources of a private, non corporate owner were of goods in transit i.e.
26 Raymond Goldsmith summarized the complexity of financial structures in the financial layering ratios.
27
The structure opens up to international financial relations: international debts are pledges of future international trade surpluses.
commerce was financed through a system of borrowing. This is why the banks that financed such trade were called commercial banks.
As the capital intensity of production increased the need to finance durable assets such as railroads and after their reforms are in place will lead to our doing the capital development of our economy well.
Within the framework of the Keynesian view the main policy objective is to put a financial structure in place which is conducive to doing the capital development well. This is the criterion by which all policy proposals are to be judged.
A quick and dirty list of some policies that may well be needed if we are to emerge from the present crisis with a financial structure that will do the capital development of the economy well include: Because it is desirable that there not be too many impoverished older people allowing for individuals to manage their own pension funds may well require that the Social Security System be opened so that the larger incomes will contribute and larger benefits will be available.
3.
The government is no different than any other organization in that it needs revenues to validate its debts. This means that the government should have a normal conditions balanced budget, allowing for deficits in recessions and depressions and major wars. Inasmuch as a government that spends some 16% to 20% of GNP is more conducive to the normal functioning of a market economy than a government that spends some 3% to 9% of GNP, the tax system must be such that it yields 16 to 20 % of GNP when a close approximation to full employment is achieved. were not performing because the aggregate economy was performing poorly rather than because the underlying project had been ill conceived.
7.
One weakness of the banking system centers around the American scheme of paying for the payments system by the differential between the return on assets and the interest paid on deposits.
In general the administration of the checking system costs some 3.5% of the amount of deposits subject to check. If the checking system were an independent profit center for banks then the banks would be in a better position to compete with the money funds. 
